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3Abstract
This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management by counties
belonging in the European Union where accounting standardization is of highly importance.
An explanation is proposed for these differences based on corruption levels existing in
individual countries. Earnings management is expected to be higher in more corrupted
countries since insiders might be more prone to exercise incentives to mask corporate
performance. The findings are consistent with this prediction and suggest that the quality of
financial reporting and audit is dependent on a multi-set of factors related to corruption.
Moreover the impact of IFRS application is explored in order to verify if earnings
management is reduced in the post adoption period. The evidence is inconclusive on the
positive role of international accounting standards in reducing the level of earnings
management. Policy implications and suggestions for further research are offered.
4Acknowledgements
To my supervisor, Professor Stergios Leventis, I would like to express my deepest
appreciation for the multifaceted support and the continuous valuable suggestions during the
design, implementation and writing of this study. Without his help and patience in all the
stages of my dissertation this outcome would not be possible.
I am grateful to the IHU administration for providing the various databases and
statistical software I used to complete this project
I would like to thank all the IHU staff for their invaluable assistance throughout the
completion of the dissertation.
Lastly, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family for their moral and mental support
during this arduous period.
5Table of Contents
1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................................6
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................................9
2.1 Earnings Management...................................................................................................................9
2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards .............................................................................10
2.3 Corruption ...................................................................................................................................12
2.4 Development of Hypothesis .........................................................................................................13
3. Research Methods and Data ..............................................................................................................17
3.1 Measuring Earnings Management ..............................................................................................17
3.2 Measuring Corruption.................................................................................................................20
3.3 Measuring Differences of Earnings Management in Pre and Post IFRS Adoption Periods.......20
3.4 Data Collection Procedure..........................................................................................................22
4. Empirical Results ..............................................................................................................................25
4.1 Univariate Tests ..........................................................................................................................25
4.2 Multivariate Tests ........................................................................................................................25
4.3 Comparison of pre and post IFRS adoption periods ...................................................................29
5. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................31
References .............................................................................................................................................33
Table of Illustrations
Figure 1..................................................................................................................................................38
Table 1...................................................................................................................................................39
Table 2...................................................................................................................................................40
Table 3...................................................................................................................................................41
Table 4...................................................................................................................................................42
Table 5...................................................................................................................................................43
Table 6...................................................................................................................................................44
Table 8...................................................................................................................................................48
61. Introduction
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been developed as an
answer to the need for high quality standards. Often accounting standards are considered as a
presupposition for high-quality accounting. In this direction European Union focused in
harmonization to eliminate differences in accounting standards across countries and establish
a common set of standards. The application of IFRS was meant to minimize the use of
discretion in managers’ decisions in order to increase reported earnings informativeness and
lessen harmful interests of insiders. For this reason, it is important to examine the motivations
behind reporting incentives and the forces shaping them. Even though various factors have
been proposed by the literature as explanatory causes for the reporting behavior of firms that
lead to earnings management, the use of corruption has not received proper attention.
However, corruption may also play an integral role in influencing reporting incentives.
Considering this relation, it is explored weather the role of corruption in conjunction with
other institutional factors and capital market forces influence the incentives of managers’ to
alter earnings. Moreover, it is examined whether IFRS are sufﬁcient to supersede insiders’
incentives to engage in earnings management or corruption affects deeper than previously
thought the quality of reported earnings.
To empirically document the relation between corruption and earnings management,
public firms from the European Union are examined. The European setting is chosen because
it provides variation both within and between countries. This cross country variation allows
the examination of possible interactions between corruption, legal enforcement and capital
market forces across time periods and how they affect the reporting behavior of firms.
It is hypothesized that the positive relation of corruption and earnings management
will affect the reported earnings informativeness. Also the adoption of IFRS will influence
the use of discretion from managers to manipulate earnings.
As it is difficult to observe ex ante managers’ discretion and informativeness of
earnings used to conceal firm performance this study focuses on one dimension of accounting
quality, the degree of earnings management (Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006). According to
Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki (2003), the measurement of earnings
management is based on four different proxies. The objective of the measures is to capture a
broad variety of earnings management procedures such as accrual manipulations and earnings
smoothing.
7Another question is whether application of IFRS is associated with less earning
management. To accomplish this difficult mission, the IASB has worked towards minimizing
the permissible accounting alternatives and in turn produce financial metrics that reflect the
bona fide economic position and performance of a firm (Barth et al., 2008). Also accounting
quality could be improved by demanding more enforcement for the offenders. To examine
the behavior of firm’s pre and post the mandatory adoption of IFRS and based on Barth,
Landsman, & Lang (2008), countries that exhibit less earnings management among the two
periods are interpreted to have higher quality earnings. The measures for earnings
management are based on the variance of the change in net income, the ratio of the variance
of the change in net income to the variance of the change in cash ﬂows, the correlation
between accruals and cash ﬂows, and the frequency of small positive net income.
The analysis is based on a sample of firms in 14 countries of European Union from
2000 to 2009. The results exhibit a substantial difference among the 14 countries of EU even
after the application of international accounting standards.  It is also documented a negative
relation of corruption and legal enforcement with earnings management. Moreover the
evidence illustrate that countries with weak legal system and enforcement display more
earnings management. This expresses the importance of proper enforcement mechanisms to
combat manager’s efforts to mask firms’ economic performance.
To examine more explicitly the interaction of corruption and earnings management,
other institutional variables are explored that are potentially different across firms and time
periods: (1) the degree of alignment between ﬁnancial and tax accounting, (2) differences in
accrual accounting across EU, (3) the level of required disclosures in public securities
offerings and related enforcement, and (4) the level of minority-shareholder protection.
The examination of these interactions supports the fact that corruption is a major
factor affecting earnings reporting. On the other hand, the analysis did not find that capital
market forces improve the informativeness of earnings. Additionally, the results did not
document a conclusive improvement after the mandatory adoption of IFRS to earnings
management. This is attributable to the significant effect of corruption and legal enforcement.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it compares the
differences in the financial reporting of firms in European Union. It does so by examining a
large sample of public traded firms in the capital markets of 14 countries of EU, across many
industries spanning at a 10 year period, not considering speciﬁc corporate events. Second,
while it is assumed that corruption has a positive effect on earnings management, it is not
obvious a priori. Thus, this study contributes to the literature by providing empirical
8evidence for this relation. Third, it explores the effects of capital market incentives on the
properties of reported earnings. Finally, this study contributes to the growing debate on the
accounting quality and harmonization.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature
and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, the research design and provides
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical tests and results. Section 5 concludes.
92. Literature Review
2.1 Earnings Management
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), earnings management is defined as the
alteration of financial reports by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence
contractual outcomes about firms’ economic performance. A crucial factor that presents
incentives for a firm to engage in earnings management arises from the possible conflict of
insiders and outsiders. As the agency theory suggests, insiders can use their position of power
in the firm to benefit at the expense of other stakeholders. On the other hand, stakeholders
tend to assume that an amount of earnings inflation exists and they incorporate it in their
predictions (Stein, 1989). Thus, it is expected that accounting discretion can make financial
reports more informative for outsiders.
A major problem arising from the research of earnings management is the difficulty to
measure it in a reliable way. As Healy and Wahlen (1999) stated, academic research offers
limited evidence of actual earnings management mainly because of these limitations in
measurement. To overcome this obstacle prior research has focused on the incentives that
lead managers to manipulate earnings. Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney (1996) suggested that
three main factors could create incentives for earnings management: (1) capital market, (2)
meeting forecasts and other targets and (3) contractual arrangements.
Information provided by financial statements is used by outsiders to determine the
value of a stock and under conditions can create incentives for managers to manipulate
earnings in order to influence outsiders’ decisions and ultimately affect the performance of
the firm. Academic research has provided evidence of earnings managements’ existence in
the following areas: (1) seasoned equity offerings (see Rangan, 1998; Teoh, Welch, & Wong,
1998b; Shivakumar, 2000; Teoh & Wong, 2002) (2) initial public offerings (see Teoh,
Welch, & Wong 1998a; Teoh, Wong, & Rao 1998; DuCharme, Malatesta, & Sefcik 2001) (3)
mergers and management buyouts (see Erickson & Wang, 1999; Perry & Williams, 1994;
Wu, 1997; DeAngelo, 1986), and (4) insider equity transactions (see Beneish & Vargus,
2002).
Several papers document that companies manage earnings to meet analysts'
benchmarks. Firms that report earnings that barely meet or beat a forecast are possible
candidates of earnings management.  Hayn (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997)
showed that the frequency of companies reporting earnings that are barely less than zero is
lower than the frequency of companies reporting earnings that are just above zero. The results
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support the evidence that insiders manage earnings to avoid reporting losses and decline in
earnings. Research from Brown (1998), Burgstabler and Eames (2006), Degeorge, Patel, &
Zeckhauser (1999), and Richardson, Teoh, & Wysocki (1999) shows an unusually large
number of zero and small positive errors as opposed to an unusually small number of small
negative errors in forecasts. Kasznik (1999) findings present evidence that managers
manipulate earnings toward their forecasts. Thus, meeting benchmarks is viewed as an
important incentive from the managers and provides some benefits to the companies that
achieve them.
Various types of contractual arrangements, such as debt covenants (DeAngelo,
DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1994; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Healy & Palepu, 1990;
Holthausen, 1981; Sweeney, 1994), management compensation contracts (Beneish, 1999;
Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Dechow & Schrand, 2004; Gao & Shrieves, 2002; Gaver, Gaver, &
Austin 1995; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995; Healy, 1985), and tax regulations or other
regulations, can provide direct motives for companies to resort to earnings management. The
incentives behind contractual-based earnings management are more apparent than other type
of earnings management. The contract specifies a target that must the firm reach, usually in
the form of earnings target.
2.2 International Financial Reporting Standards
From the fiscal year starting in 1 January 2005 as Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002
requires, all EU listed companies are required to prepare their consolidated accounts in
conformity with IFRS. Due to the fact that accounting standards used in EU must be
authorized by the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), IFRS applied in EU may differ
from that used in other countries. Armstrong et al. (2010) found that stock market reacted
positively in the mandatory announcement of international standards.
After examining the incentives that lead managers to manipulate earnings, focus is
hinged on accounting quality and how it can influence earnings management. Alford, Jones,
Leftwich, & Zmijewski (1993) suggested that informativeness of financial reports is affected
by countries’ accounting standards. Barth et al. (2008) found that firms adopting IFRS exhibit
less earnings smoothing and earnings management, all of which are evidence of higher
accounting quality.
Ball, Robin, & Wu (2003) suggested that adopting high quality standards might be a
necessary guarantee for high quality financial reporting. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen
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(2005) empirically found that the adoption of IFRS is associated with higher financial
reported quality.
Daske and Gebhardt (2006) found evidence that the disclosure quality of firms
adopting IFRS, mandatory or voluntary, has increased significantly. Thus, a first inference is
the adoption IFRS appears to reduce earnings management, cost of capital and forecast errors
by reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Findings from
previous researches support this argument.
Barth et al. (2008) suggested that through the elimination of alternative accounting
methods that are used by insiders to manage earnings and present less informative accounts,
the accounting quality could be improved. They provide evidence suggesting that firms
implementing IFRS report lower earnings management. Specifically, they find that after
implementation companies report overall a higher variance of the change in net income, a
higher ratio of the variances of the change in net income and change in cash flows, a less
negative correlation between accruals and cash flows, and lower frequency of small positive
net income. Unlike Barth et al. (2008), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) found no
differences in earnings management between firms reporting under German GAAP and firms
adopted IFRS in Germany. However, the differences could be ascribed to the use of Jones
(1991) accrual model.
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) examined the impact of changing accounting standards,
from German GAAP to either IFRS or U.S GAAP, in the cost of capital and information
asymmetry. They used bid-ask spread, trading volume, and share price volatility as proxies
for measuring the information asymmetry. After controlling for various firm characteristic
and self-selection bias, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) found that firms adopting IFRS or U.S
GAAP exhibit lower percentage bid-ask spreads and higher share turnover than firms using
German GAAP. On the contrary, evidence from Daske (2006) fails to support a decrease in
cost of equity capital for firms using IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Similarly, Leuz (2003) fails to find
any statistically or economically significant differences in bid ask-spreads and share turnover
for firms trading in Germany’s New Market and using IFRS and U.S. GAAP.
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) showed that the reduction of analysts’ forecast errors is
positively associated with the adoption of IFRS. They argued that improved forecast accuracy
is due to the difference of accounting standards between IFRS and domestic ones.
Tarca (2004) suggested that competitive market forces are responsible for the
adoption of international accounting standards. Also the international regime would provide a
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better place for information communication with outsiders and possibly send a positive signal
to capital markets.
The above findings, with their limitations, introduced a link between higher quality
financial statements and factors that decrease the ability of insiders to manipulate earnings,
thus ensuring more information disclosure. Ultimately the switch to IFRS in EU will provide
higher liquidity for the financial markets and lower cost of capital for adopting firms.
2.3 Corruption
A long debate is under way over the best way to define the term corruption (see
Johnston, 1995). To overcome this problem and to foster some standardization, the World
Bank, Transparency International and UNDP have defined corruption as the “abuse of public
office for private gain.” Even though this definition is widely adopted, criticisms stem from
the fact that it may be culturally biased and excessively narrow (UNDP, 2008).
Corruption has been identified as the cause for suboptimal economic growth (Barro,
1996; Mauro, 1996), and the deterioration of economies, societies, and political systems
(Kimbro, 2002). Moreover corruption augments reduced investment caused by inefficient
government (Mauro, 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1995), insufficient economic competitiveness
(Ades & Tella, 1999) and a decrease in the level of trust by citizens due to ineffective
institutions (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997, 1998; Knack & Keefer,
1997). Corruption affects resource allocation, decreases the trust for government and private
firms, and has a retrograde effect in societies (Kimbro, 2002).
Robinson (1998) argues that corruption can be observed at three levels, individual,
organizational, institutional, or societal level. More importantly, corruption can be seen as a
function of specific organizations, especially those that do not have the proper policies and
procedures, have insufficient administration or publicity (Hamir, 1999). Also corruption at
organization level can be observed at under-funding organizations or organizations that
maintain large monopolies or ‘rents’ (Gray & Kaufmann, 1998).
Political or country risk can be created by corrupt country institutions. Gray and
Kaufmann (1998) suggested that corruption can be connected with low ‘risk-spreading
mechanisms’, for instance proper insurance schemes.  Lack of proper punishment
mechanisms for institutions (Hamir, 1999) or inadequate government involvement (La
Palombara, 1994) can increase corruption.
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Consideration should be given to the role of all the sides in the corruption equation.
So attention is not given only to public official but also to the members of the business
community (foreign and domestic), civil society, international lenders, foreign governments,
and non-governmental organizations.
World Bank (1994) mentioned that countries wanting to fight corruption and improve
their accountability systems should focus on the following:
1. Implementing an effective and integrated financial management information
system
2. Developing a competent base of accountants and auditors
3. Adopting international accounting standards
4. Endorse a strong legal framework to accompany modern accounting practices
Kimbro (2002) and Triandis et al. (2001), found a relationship between cultural
variables and corruption. Kimbro (2002) suggests that countries that have better legislation,
more effective judiciary, good financial reporting standards, and a higher concentration of
accountants are less corrupt. This is in line with Mollenhoff (1988) and Kaufmann and
Siegelbaum (1996) that increased accountability, transparency, independent oversight, audits,
and information access will lead to increased probability of detection. Fan, Li, & Yang
(2010) proposed that relationship networks formed by family, social, and political ties are a
potential reason for decreased firm informativeness. Along with the inability of accounting
systems to fully incorporate the quantity, quality, and contribution of relationship networks
this results to low earnings informativeness.
2.4 Development of Hypothesis
Accounting standards generally allows for considerable discretion in various parts. As
explained earlier in this study, insiders can use discretion in their advantage to mask poor
economic performance, to accomplish earnings targets or to avoid violation of contractual
arrangements. Due to information asymmetry, it is difficult for insiders to restrain from such
behavior.
Following Burgstahler et al. (2006), capital market forces and the home country’s
institutional features are factors that define the role of earnings and shape firms’ reporting
incentives.
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Capital market forces. Publicly traded firms are in the need of acquiring external finance and
thus they must provide more information for investors to evaluate the performance of the
firm. Also outsiders do not have access to private information and to a degree rely on public
available information, especially financial statements and reported earnings. As a result if the
quality of the provided information is poor then outsiders will be unwilling to provide
finance. This gives incentives to public firms to provide financial statements that reflect
reality. As Burgstahler et al. (2006) noted being a public firm is likely to be associated with
higher reporting quality.
Capital markets influence firms’ incentives to report earnings that do not hide the true
economic performance. But this is not always the case as it also creates situations with the
opposite result. For instance the abuse of insider’s power may lead them to engage into
actions to hide these activities and manipulate the economic performance of the firm by
managing reported earnings (Leuz et al., 2003). More incentives are already analyzed in the
previous section. What becomes clear is that specific situations for firms to misrepresent
economic performance exist but it is unclear the extent. Thus, the empirical search will try to
answer the question of whether capital market forces press firms to become more informative
in their financial statements and reported earnings.
Corruption measures and other institutional factors. The domestic institutional framework
can form the reporting incentives. Prior work has displayed that institutional differences
influence the reporting behavior of public firms (Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000; Leuz et al.,
2003; Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004).
There is little information about how corruption affects the level of earnings
management. To address this void, this study examines the relation between them and how it
is influenced by various institutional factors. Corruption is measured by two proxies. First
proxy is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which directly evaluates how corrupt is a
country. Second proxy is the quality of legal enforcement. Failure for a country to impose the
legal rules stems mainly from the lack of proper enforcement. Thus, these countries are more
likely to abuse the discretion given by the accounting rules (Burgstahler et al., 2006). This
leads to the first hypothesis that firms in countries with high corruption and weak legal
enforcement are more likely to manipulate their earnings. Therefore,
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H1: Ceteris paribus, a firm that operates in a highly corrupted country where judicial
system is ineffective is more likely to engage in more earnings management (than in a
country with low corruption and effective courts).
As Burgstahler et al. (2006) proposed this paper examines three other factors that
might have a differential effect on countries with high and low corruption: (1) financial
accounting and tax alignment, (2) differences in accrual accounting rules, and (3) securities
regulation and minority-shareholder protection.
Ball et al. (2000) hypothesized that the association between financial and tax
accounting could influence the firms’ reporting behavior. So the first factor for analysis is the
effect of tax accounting on reported earnings. An observed close link between reported
earnings and taxable income will provide incentives for a firm to alter its economic
performance (Alford et al. 1993). Also a difference of tax alignment of financial accounting
is anticipated in countries with different level of corruption. To summarize, firms in countries
with less corruption are expected to be more concerned about earnings informativeness. On
the other hand countries with high corruption may provide incentives to firms to make
earnings less informative in order to minimize taxes.
The second factor for analysis is the effect of accounting rules that are designed to
produce timely and informative earnings. Generally, accrual rules are designed to have a
positive effect on earnings informativeness of firms, if they are used properly. But, the use of
accruals provides more discretion to firms.
H2: The effect of accrual rules depends on firms’ reporting incentives and thus is
likely to differ across corruption levels. It is expected that the use of accruals are associated
with less earnings management.
Finally, in the analysis is also checked weather stricter disclosure rules in securities
offerings and associated enforcement reduces earnings management. In a similar way, strong
minority-shareholder protection rules are examined, because they are expected to reduce
earnings management.
Measures of accounting quality. Following previous research, the accounting quality is
operationalized using earnings management measures. A prediction here is that firms in the
post IFRS adoption period exhibit less earnings management. Yet there are reasons that
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possibly reverse the previous prediction. Accounting quality can be affected by managers’
opportunistic discretion and possible errors in accruals’ estimation (Barth et al., 2008).
With the aim of identifying potential differences between pre and post adoption of
IFRS periods, two measures of earnings management are used, one of earnings smoothing
and another of managing towards positive earnings. It is hypothesized that firms in the post
adoption of IFRS period manage earnings less than pre adoption period; international
accounting standards limit the management’s discretion to report earnings that are not
reflecting true economic performance of the firm.
Following prior research, firms with more variable earnings exhibit less earnings
smoothing (Barth et al. 2008; Lang, Raedy, & Yetman, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Lang, Raedy,
& Wilson, 2006). Therefore, the hypothesis is that firms in the post adoption period exhibit
more variable earnings than those in the pre adoption periods. To test the hypothesis and
following the research of Lang et al. (2006) and Barth et al. (2008), two measures for
earnings variability are formulated, variability of change in net income and variability of
change in net income compared against variability of change in cash flow. There is a
likelihood outlined by Barth et al. (2008) that higher earnings variability could be suggestive
of lower earnings quality because of an error in estimating accruals. Hence, lower earnings
variability can be observed in higher quality accounting systems.
Firms that exhibit a more negative correlation between accruals and cash flows are
suspected to smooth earnings more (Lang et al., 2003; Leuz et al., 2003; Lang et al., 2006).
Work of Land and Lang (2002) and Myers, Myers & Skinner (2007) showed that a more
negative correlation is an indicator of earnings smoothing because managers increase
accruals in response to poor cash flow outcomes. It is hypothesized that firms in the post
adoption period of IFRS exhibit a less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows
than those in the pre adoption period.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Leuz et al., (2003) used the frequency of small
positive net income as a measure to provide evidence of earnings management. As explained
earlier managers prefer to report small positive net income rather than negative net income.
Thus, the hypothesis is that firms in the post adoption IFRS period report small positive net
income less frequently than firms in the pre adoption period.
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3. Research Methods and Data
3.1 Measuring Earnings Management
The area of European Union provides an exceptional opportunity for research in the
subject of earnings management. The first reason is that there are abundant differences in
institutional factors across Europe. Countries are categorized either as common-law or code-
law based on the origin of their legal system. Common-law counties, U.K for example, are
viewed as having more income conservatism mainly because of the laws behind the arm’s-
length debt, equity market and the litigation system. Their accounting practices are
determined primarily from the private sector and the demand for public disclosure. On the
other side code-law countries such as Germany or Italy are presumed as insider economies
(Burgstahler et al., 2006) because of the close relations they maintain with bank and legal
institutions and the accounting rules designed to facilitate the need of the government. Code-
law gives considerably more discretion than common-law. The Netherlands and the
Scandinavian countries are typically considered to be somewhere in the middle.
Secondly, accounting standards in the EU countries are formally harmonized and also
after 2005 all listed companies are required to use IFRS.  This is a step further to reduce the
effect of the many legal origins that exist in Europe and reduce the diverse, country specific
accounting systems. Even after the adoption, accounting quality varies considerably across
countries and thus IFRS provides a stimulating setting to explore the consequences of
financial disclosure. Barth et al. (2008) indicated that the manipulation of earnings by
management can be reduced by improving the accounting quality and by eliminating the
alternative accounting methods that don’t reflect the reality of a firm’s performance. Ball et
al. (2003) argued that the adoption of high quality accounting standards might be a necessary
step for more informativeness, but not necessarily a sufficient one. Considering all this,
European Union is a very fruitful area for research as it provides variation both within and
between countries.
This research tries to capture the extent to which insiders use discretion to manage
earnings.  However it is not possible to directly observe if firms use discretion to manipulate
their earnings and consequently alter the informativeness of their economic performance.
Therefore the use of proxies is necessary to capture the multiple dimensions of insiders’
effort to make earnings less informative. Consideration should be given in accounting rules
that can and often are bypassed by insiders’ and hence do not reflect the real practices of a
firm (Leuz et al., 2003; Ball et al., 2003).
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Following Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) and drawing from previous
accounting research (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Dechow & Skinner, 2000) four proxies are
computed to capture outcomes of firms’ earnings management activities: (1) the smoothness
of earnings relative to cash flows, (2) the correlation between accounting accruals and
operating cash flows, (3) the magnitude of total accrual and (4) the tendency of firms to avoid
small losses. Even though it is understandable that the above proxies are not flawless and
represent earnings management in a relative sense, recent studies that used the above proxies
suggested the country rankings they generate are congruous with the pervasive perception of
earnings management (Lang et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006; Wysocki 2004).
Smoothing reported operating earnings using accruals. Managers can hide true firms’
economic performance by smoothing operating earnings. Therefore, the first earning
management measure captures in what degree managers’ reduce the variability of reported
earnings using accruals. It is calculated as the median ratio of the standard deviation of
operating income divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations in firm-
level, multiplied by -1 so that higher values indicate more earning smoothing (Burgstahler et
al. 2006; Lang et al. 2003; Lang et al. 2006). Scaling by cash flow from operations is used to
control for differences of economic performance across firms. The standard deviations are
calculated over the cross-section.
Because direct data for cash flow from operations is not available in the cash flow
statement of many European companies, it is computed indirectly by subtracting the accrual
component from earnings. Following Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, (1995), the accrual
component of earnings is computed as (Δtotal current assets - Δcash) - (Δtotal current
liabilities - Δshort-term debt – Δincome taxes payable) - depreciation expense, where Δ
denotes the change over the last fiscal year. If a firm does not report information on cash,
short-term debt or taxes, then the change in the variables is assumed to be zero. All
accounting items are scaled by lagged total assets to ensure comparability across firms.
Smoothing and the correlation between changes in accounting accruals and operating cash
flows. The second measure examines the use of discretion to conceal shocks in the economic
performance of a firm. Insiders can use accruals to hide inadequate current performance or
delay the reporting of superior current performance to create reserves for the future. For both
cases this lead to a negative correlation between changes in accruals and operating cash
flows. Although the negative correlation is an expected result of accrual accounting (Dechow,
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1994), the larger the amplitude of this correlation indicates, ceteris paribus, more smoothing
of reported earnings and consequently economic performance of firm that is not indicative of
reality. Therefore the second measure is computed as the contemporaneous Spearman
correlation between changes in total accruals and changes in the cash flow from operations
(both scaled by lagged total assets). It is calculated for each industry-country unit and
multiplied by -1 as before so higher values indicate higher levels of earnings management
(Burgstahler et al., 2006).
Discretion in reported earnings: The magnitude of accruals. Firms can also use discretion to
falsify their economic performance.  For example, to achieve certain earnings targets or
report extraordinary performance firms can exaggerate reported earnings, in cases such as
equity issuance (see, Dechow & Skinner, 2000; Teoh et al. 1998a).  Equivalently, the firms
can boost their earnings using reserves or aggressive revenue recognition practices in the
years they underperform. What links both examples is the temporary inflation of earnings due
to accrual choices, while cash flows remain unaffected. Thus, the third proxy is the
magnitude of accruals relative to the magnitude of operating cash flow. It is computed as the
median ration of the absolute value of total accruals scaled by the corresponding value of
cash flow from operations for an industry within a country. The scaling controls for
differences in firm size and performance.
Discretion in reported earnings: Small loss avoidance. Findings from Burgstahler and
Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) suggest that U.S. firm’s exercise their discretion to
evade the report of small losses. Although managers attempt to avoid losses of any amount,
the limited choices in financial reporting standards prevent them from reporting profits in the
occurrence of large losses. But small losses are more likely to be acceptable in reporting
discretion. Thus, the fourth earnings management measurement is the ratio of small profits to
small losses that indicate the use of accounting discretion by the firm to avoid losses.
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) the ratio of small profit to small losses is
calculated, by industry and country, using after tax net income scaled by total assets. A firm-
year observation is classified as small profit if it falls in the range of [-0.01, 0.00) and a small
loss if it is in the range of [0.00, 0.01].
Aggregate measure of earnings management. To diminish potential errors in the individual
scores, an aggregate measure of earnings management is used. Each individual score is
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transformed in a percentage rank (ranging from 0 to 100) and then combined by averaging
the ranking of the four measures into an aggregate index of earnings management, denoted
EMaggr. Higher scores suggest higher levels of earnings management.
3.2 Measuring Corruption
Two measures are used for Corruption, the Transparency International (TI)
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the quality of legal enforcement, which is computed
as the mean value across the three proxies from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, &
Vishny (1998): (1) an index of the judicial system, (2) an index of the rule of law, and (3) the
level of corruption. Quality of legal enforcement ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values
corresponding to stricter legal enforcement.
The CPI, which is published since 1995, measures the perception of corruption that is
present among public officials and politicians. It ranks countries based on 16 different
surveys from 10 independent institutions. There has to be at least 3 surveys for a country to
be listed in the ranking. A country is perceived as having no corruption when it is scored 10
and on the other hand a country is perceived highly corrupted when it is scored zero.1 CPI is a
snapshot of the opinions of those that fill out the surveys. The goal of CPI is to create
awareness of the side effects of corruptions and alert governments for the negative effect of
corruption
Transparency International has received a lot of criticism since it first published the
CPI. The main argument stems from the difficulty to measure directly the corruption.
Because of that proxies must be used. Thus the TI is relying on third-party surveys that are
criticized to be potentially unreliable.
3.3 Measuring Differences of Earnings Management in Pre and Post IFRS Adoption Periods
Following Barth et al. (2008) four earnings management metrics are computed to test
for possible differences between pre and post adoption of IFRS periods. The first earnings
smoothing metric is based on the volatility of earnings scaled by lagged total assets, ΔNI
(Lang, Raedy, & Wilson, 2006). A smaller variability of earnings presents evidence of
earnings smoothing. Because earnings are sensitive to various factors, ΔNI is calculated as
1 A country with the lowest rank doesn’t mean it is the most corrupted in the world. Rather, it is perceived to be the most
corrupt according to the surveys and ultimately to the people that responded.
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the variance of the residuals from the regression of change in net income on the control
variables (Raedy, & Yetman, 2003; Lang et al., 2006).
∆ = + + + + ++ + +
Where SIZE is the natural logarithm of the end of year market value of equity, GROWTH is
the percentage change in sales, EISSUE is the percentage change in common stock, LEV is
the end of year total liabilities divided by end of year equity book value, DISSUE is the
percentage change in total liabilities, TURN is sales divided by end of year total assets, CF is
annual net cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total assets. The
equation is estimated by pooling observations that are relevant to the adoption period. The
test of differences for the variability of ΔNI is reported between post and pre adoption
periods.
The second earnings smoothing metric is the ratio of the variance of change in net
income, ΔNI, to the variance of change in net cash flows, ΔCF. Firms that report more
volatile cash flows will unsurprisingly have more volatile net income. As before, because
ΔCF is likely to be sensitive to a range of factors, variability of ΔCF is calculated as the
variance of the residuals from the regression of net cash flows on the control variables.
∆ = + + + + ++ + +
There is no known formal statistical test for differences in the ratios of variances. However,
the test of differences for the variability of ΔCF is calculated for each sample. If both test of
differences for ΔNI and ΔCF are statistically significant the result is reported.
The third earnings smoothing measure is the Spearman correlation between accruals
and cash flows. Obviously there is a negative correlation between accruals and cash flows, so
magnitude of this correlation is checked. As previous research indicated (Myers et al., 2007;
Land and Lang, 2002), ceteris paribus, a more negative correlation is evidence of earnings
smoothing. The correlation is calculated between the residuals of accruals and the residuals of
net cash flow, regressed on the control variables (excluding the cash flows).
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= + + + + ++ +
= + + + + ++ +
Finally the last measure of earnings management is small positive earnings as defined
by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). Additionally, Leuz et al. (2003) found that countries with
weak investor protection show more presence of small positive earnings. The metric is the
coefficient on small positive net income, SPOS, in the following regression:
= + + + + ++ + +
POST is an indicator variable that equals one for observations in the postadoption period and
zero otherwise. SPOS is an indicator variable that equals one if net income scaled by total
assets is between 0 and 0.01 (Lang et al., 2003). A negative coefficient on SPOS suggests
that firms in the pre IFRS adoption period have more of a tendency to manage earnings
toward small positive amounts than in the post IFRS adoption period.
3.4 Data Collection Procedure
Data are obtained from the Worldscope database supplied by Thomson
Reuters Datastream. In order to understand at what extend international accounting standards
reflect more or less earnings managements, two sub periods are examined, one prior to the
mandatory adoption of IFRS and one after it. Thus three periods are examined: (1) from 2000
to 2009, (2) from 2000 to 2004 and (3) from 2005 to 2009.
The starting sample contains firm-year observations of public companies in one of the
15 member states of EU from year 2000 on and Worldscore contains data for current year’s
net income and previous year’s total assets. Each firm must have income statement and
balance sheet information for at least three years before the mandatory adoption of IFRS and
at least three years after. Banks, insurance companies and financial holding are excluded
from the sample. Accounting decisions of the above firms can bias the results, if they are
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included in the empirical analysis. For a country to be included in the sample, at least 300
firm-year observations are needed. Due to this Luxembourg is excluded from analysis.
To alleviate the influence of outliers and potential data errors the winsorize technique
is used for all accounting items that are used in the computation of the proxies at the 1st and
99th percentile. The final sample comprises of 23,151 firm-year observations from publicly
traded companies for the fiscal years from 2000 to 2009.
Prior research used country-level observations (Leuz et al. 2003). Following
Burgstahler et al. (2006) and in order to control better the firm characteristics, the unit of
analysis is calculated per industry-level using the industry classification of Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS). So each earning management and aggregate score is
calculated by country and industry, resulting in 126 possible observations (= 14 countries × 9
industry classes).
Table 1 presents the number of firm-year observations per country along with
descriptive statistics for the sample firm and countries. The significant variation is due to the
differences in the capital market growth of each country. Median firm size in EUR€ is
reported for comparison between countries. Even though the median capital intensity
variation has not large differences across countries, all financial variables are scaled by
lagged total assets. Also Table 1 do not show large differences in variation of GDP per capita,
inflation and volatility of growth across countries with the exception of Greece and Portugal.
[Insert table 1 hereabouts]
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the four individual earnings management
measures as well as of the aggregate earnings management score for all the time periods.
Generally the earnings management scores are consistent with previous researches (see
Burgstahler et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003) with the striking exception of Austria.  The four
individual earnings management measurements exhibit significant differences between pre
and after IFRS adoption, with the period after the fiscal year 2005 to show less earnings
management across countries. By taking into consideration all the changes that occurred on
the sub-periods, we examine the results of earnings management measurements in all fiscal
years from 2000 to 2009. The statistics for the first measure (EM1) show that earnings are
smoother in central Europe than in the Scandinavian countries or the U.K. A similar pattern is
observed in the second measure (EM2) with Greece and Portugal to report larger negative
correlations of changes in accruals and cash flows than for example than in Sweden or in
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U.K.. Accounting discretion measured in the third earnings management proxy (EM3) shows
that it is small in the U.K and Ireland compared to Germany, Italy, Greece and Portugal.
Finally, the fourth measure (EM4) reveals that the countries of the Iberian Peninsula and
Netherlands exhibit greater loss avoidance than Sweden and U.K.
[Insert table 2 hereabouts]
High correlation is reported among the earnings management measures. Also the
standings of the four individual measures and of the aggregate earnings management score
are similar. The country ranking of aggregate earnings management scores shows high
ranking for Portugal and Greece and low ranks for U.K. and Sweden.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for firm characteristics used as control variables
in the regression tests. The choice of the control variables was based prior work that suggests
a connection with the level of earnings management or accruals and can capture the
heterogeneity among firms. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency
International from years 2000 to 2009. Following Burgstahler et al., (2006) firm size (SIZE)
is measured as the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (in EUR thousands).
Financial leverage is included to check for potential differences in the extent of agency costs
and asymmetric information that contribute to access of capital and other financial decisions
(Titman and Wessels 1988; Rajan and Zingales 1995). The financial leverage (LEV) is
calculated as the ratio of total non-current liabilities to total assets.
Other control variables that are potential sources for variation in accruals are firm
growth, profitability and the length of the operating cycle. GROWTH is defined as the annual
percentage change in revenue. Profitability is measured as return on assets (ROA) defined as
net income divided by lagged total assets. CYCLE is calculated as the addition of inventories
held in days and   accounts receivables in days.
[Insert table 3 hereabouts]
The results of Table 3 show that, firms differ slightly between the periods before and
after the adoption of IFRS. Every single earnings management measure is significant lower
from period to periods judging from the median of EMaggr. Table 4 provides descriptive
country-level information on the legal, institutional, and capital market variables.
[Insert table 4 hereabouts]
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4. Empirical Results
4.1 Univariate Tests
Table 5 panel A reports pairwise Spearman correlations. Most of the four individual
earnings management measures are highly correlated and the aggregate index represents them
acceptable. Factor analysis supports the use of an aggregate index. Findings reveal only one
factor with an Eigenvalue above 1 that the four individual scores display significant loadings.
To further check for anomalies earnings management measures found in this paper are
benchmarked against those in Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al., (2006). The analysis
reveals that correlation between their measures and the proxies in this paper, calculated on
country-level for public firms, is relatively high comparing to Leuz et al. (2003) (EM4
produces the lowest score ρ=0.41, followed by EM1 with ρ=0.68 and EMaggr with ρ=0.82)
and above 0.60 comparing to Burgstahler et al., (2006) (EM2 produces the lowest score
ρ=0.61, followed by EM4 with ρ=0.62 and a very low EMaggr with ρ=0.64). The lower
correlation scores in Burgstahler et al., (2006) is possibly a result from using the Amadeus
database that contains small number of public firms.
Table 5 panel B reports mean and median for EMaggr for subgroups defined by quality
of legal enforcement and CPI.  Binary variable indicators are created for high and low
enforcement quality and corruption perception by splitting LEGAL and CPI in the median.
The results show that countries with strict enforcement show the lowest level of earnings
management. Similar, countries with low corruption perception show the lowest level of
earnings management. The test for mean differences reveals a substantial variation of
earnings management between EU countries when checking for corruption. The results
suggest that both variables play a significant role in the way European public firms report
earnings.
[Insert table 5 hereabouts]
4.2 Multivariate Tests
Table 6 presents the results of regressions that examine the role of corruption and the
quality of legal system and enforcement, and include various controls for differences in firm
characteristics. The two variables are used as proxies for measuring corruption, directly and
indirectly respectively. Separate results are provided for the different period groups as
defined by the mandatory adoption or not of international accounting standards. The
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dependent variable in table 6 is the aggregate earnings management index based on the four
measures used in Leuz et al. (2003) and Burgstahler et al. (2006).
The table 6 is divided by periods spanning from fiscal years 2000 to 2009, 2000 to
2004 and 2005 to 2009, depending on the IFRS adoption. The first column of each group
presents the effect of the control variables on the level of earnings management. These
variables control firm size, financial leverage, growth, return on assets, and operating cycle.
They are introduced to check heterogeneity in firms’ which could in terms affect the reported
earnings.
The coefficient on CPI in all columns is significantly negative. This fining points out
that the higher (lower) the level of earnings management the lower (higher) is the score of
corruption perception index. On the other hand the coefficient on LEGAL is negative but not
significant, in all columns. Except for financial leverage and operating cycle (not in all
occasions), no other firm-level control is statistically significant. Interestingly, the size
coefficient even though it is not statistically significant in most occasions, has a negative
sign.
The first column in each group presents the effect of control variables in earnings
management. These variables explain the 37, 35, and 33 percent respectively of the total
variation in earnings management. In the second column the LEGAL variable is added but
the adjusted R-square changes a little. Finally in the third column the effect of CPI in
earnings management is examined. The variables explain the 40, 35, and 40 percent
respectively of the total variation in earnings management.
[Insert table 6 hereabouts]
The role of additional institutional features and corruption.This section is focused on the
institutional factors that are expected to differentiate among countries with high and low
corruption. The regression analysis is based on the base models two and three of table 7. Also
the institutional variables are transformed into binary indicator variables to capture whether
the relation between earnings management and tax alignment, accrual accounting rules,
securities regulation and outside investor protection in fact differs across countries with
different level of corruption (Burgstahler et al., 2006). These indicator variables are created
by splitting at the median of the institutional factors except the ANTIDIR and TAX_CONF
(see Table 7). For the sub-period spanning from 2005 to 2009 the variable ROA is highly
correlated with CPI. To eliminate the multicollinearity effects an indicator variable is
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introduced by splitting at the median. The variance inflation factor is within acceptable
boundaries in all regressions.
[Insert table 7 hereabouts]
Financial accounting and tax alignment. The first institutional factor tries to capture the
differences in the tax regimes across EU countries. Based on the previous work of
Burgstahler et al. (2006) and the classification provided by Alford et al. (1993) and Hung
(2001), the TAX variable shows the country convergence between financial and tax
accounting. The TAX variable takes the value of 1 if financial and tax accounts are highly
aligned and 0 otherwise. Following of Burgstahler et al. (2006) we assume tax status of 1 in
countries with missing information (Austria, Greece, and Portugal).
Column one in table 7 presents the results of the TAX variable. The coefficient for tax
alignment has a positive sign and is not significant. This changes for the two sub-periods as it
becomes statistically significant. Based on Burgstahler et al. (2006) the tax conformity
variable is used to measure if there are tax incentives. It is created by multiplying the tax
alignment factor with the average corporate tax rate.
The indicator variable that is created from this combined metric uses the tax rate of 28
percent for periods 2000 to 2009 and 200 to 2004 and 25 percent for period 2005 to 2009 as
cut-off value to include the three countries with low tax alignment to the base group. The
TAX_CONF splits the sample into countries with high tax alignment and tax rates and
countries with low tax alignment and tax rates. Earnings informativeness is affected by tax
considerations, which explains why countries from the former group have less informative
earnings. Findings from the column two of the table 7 is consistent with this prediction as
TAX_CONF has a positive relation even though it no significant. On the other hand, a
positive and highly significant effect is found on the sub-periods, suggesting that countries
with high tax alignment and tax rates have firms that employ more earnings management.
Similar results are obtained when CPI is replaced by LEGAL.
Remaining differences in accrual accounting rules. The second institutional factor captures
the accounting differences in the EU. It is measured by the accrual rules index formulated by
Hung (2001) and updated for EU countries by Comprix et al. (2003). The index calculates the
deviation of a country’s’ accounting system from cash method accounting. Higher index
values correspond to higher use of accrual accounting.
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Column three in table 7 shows the relation between accrual accounting and earnings
management. The results show that ACCRUAL is negative and not statistically significant.
This point out that the effects of accrual accounting rules don’t affect the level of earnings
management, by taking into consideration the significant negative effect of the corruption
variable. Insignificant positive coefficients are the results from the sub-periods. An
explanation for the above findings is that accrual index does not fully incorporate the changes
from the adoption of international accounting standards.
Results from regressions using the LEGAL variables suggest a negative and
insignificant effect of accrual index and earnings management. The change of the sign could
be attributed to the different impact of LEGAL to the regression. Similar are the results from
the sub-periods.
Securities regulation and minority-shareholder protection. Following Burgstahler et al.
(2006) the third institutional factor captures the differences in securities regulation. It is
formulated by averaging the three indices from La Porta et al. (2006): (1) the disclosure
requirements, (2) the liability standard index, and (3) the public enforcement index. Thus the
SECREG summary variable present how effective the securities regulation of a country is.
Also to capture minority-shareholder protection, a fourth third institutional factor is
constructed by using the anti-director rights index from La Porta et al. (1998). The index
ranges from 0 to 6. Values of 4 of higher represent higher outside investor protection, which
is why it is used as a cut-off point for the creation of the indicator variable (e.g., Leuz et al.
2005).
Column four and five present the results in the regression models when the two
variables are introduced. SECREG is positive and statistically insignificant. This is in
contrast to Burgstahler et al. (2006) that found a marginally significant and negative effect.
Possibly the effects of corruption are exceeding any positive effects of strong securities
regulation in capital markets to reduce the level of earnings management. Unlike previous
variable, ANTIDIR is negative and significant at 0.1 or better in all periods. This is
interpreted as evidence that capital markets, force public traded firms to provide earnings that
reflect their real economic performance.
Columns nine and ten from the main period produce analogous findings as previous.
Whereas the SECREG has a sign change in the sub-periods and it is significant at 0.1 level at
2000-2004 period.
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4.3 Comparison of pre and post IFRS adoption periods
Table 8, panels A and B presents the results for earnings smoothing and managing
toward earnings targets for the period pre and post IFRS adoption.
[Insert table 8 hereabouts]
Results for earnings smoothing are reported in column one and four of panel A for the
respected time periods. The test of net income variability suggests that 8 out of 14 countries
have less volatile earnings in the pre adoption period. The evidence for the eight countries
show that the variability of net income is substantially greater for the post adoption of IFRS
period and the difference is statistically significant for all eight countries at 0.01 level.
The results from the ratio of earnings variability to cash flow variability yield similar
conclusion. Again, only 8 out of 14 countries demonstrate the predicted values. Nevertheless,
in those countries the ratio of net income variability to cash flow variability is considerably
larger for post adoption periods than in pre adoption periods. In accordance to Lang et al
(2006) and Barth et al (2008) the net income variability cannot be attributed only to the
difference in cash flow variability.
The table 8, panel A, column three and six show the results from the correlation
between cash flows and accruals. The evidence shows that firms from 8 out of 14 countries
are more likely to use accruals to manage earnings between the two periods. The partial
spearman correlation between cash flows and accruals is significantly more negative in those
countries in the post adoption period.
The results from table 8, panel A column seven suggest that less countries (6) are
likely to smooth earnings mainly in the post adoption period. Although the SPOS coefficient
is negative for more countries than positive is mainly insignificant except in three cases
(Belgium, Greece, Netherlands). This finding indicates that firms in countries with positive
SPOS coefficient report more frequently small positive earnings in the post adoption period
than in the pre adoption, which is consistent with managing earnings towards a positive
target.
Panel B of table 8 presents the results from the pooled observation for pre and post
adoption period. The variability of ΔNI is in the predicted direction of being larger in the post
adoption period, even though it is not significant. The variability of ΔNI over ΔCF is greater
in the pre adoption period, but insignificant. The correlation of accrual and cash flows is not
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in the predicted direction showing that firms use more accruals in the post adoption period to
manage earnings. Finally the SPOS coefficient is negative and not significant.
Generally the results do not produce conclusive evidence that the adoption of
international accounting standards reduced the level of earnings management. Even though
high quality standards are a step into reducing earnings management it is not a sufficient one,
according to the results of this paper and Ball et al, (2003). Moreover a test of differences in
the corruption perception index between the two periods with p-value 0.5969 (not reported)
does not reveal a significant change. The findings are more close to those of Van Tendeloo
and Vanstraelen, (2005)which indicate that the adoption of IFRS cannot be associated with
lower earnings management than those of Barth et al. (2008) showing that firms applying
international accounting standards exhibit less earnings management. Other factors should be
considered as driving effects of earnings management such as corruption.
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5. Conclusions
The 14 countries of European Union exhibit different levels of earnings management.
Because earnings management is difficult to be directly observed, proxies were used to
circumvent this limitation and capture various aspects of earnings manipulation.
Various studies have sought to identify the driving forces that lead managers to alter
earnings reports for their benefit. Another group of researches focused on isolating the effects
of earnings markets in several areas. As previously discussed, the purpose of this study was
to link corruption and earnings management. Furthermore special interest was given to the
influence of IFRS in reducing earnings management and how that affects corruption levels.
The purpose of this paper is to extent the accounting literature by providing evidence
of a positive association between corruption and earnings management. Moreover it
contributes to the debate on the impact of international accounting standards in the quality of
financial reporting. In addition it explores the relation of capital markets and the effects on
the firms’ reporting earnings.
The univariate results presented a consistency with previous studies. Furthermore, a
link between both the legal environment and the corruption perception with the level of the
earnings management was uncovered. A positive relation among the two proxies for
corruption and the aggregate level of earnings management was observed. A first inference
would be that the above association may affect the incentives of earnings manipulation and
create a positive environment to increase these motivations.
The outcomes of the multivariate regressions strengthen the above interpretation of
the results. Both legal enforcement and corruption explain at least 35 and near 40 percent of
the total variation in the aggregate earnings management. This interpretation can be extended
to both sub-periods, spanning from pre and post international standards’ mandatory adoption.
Following that a series of institutional factors and their effect on earnings
management were examined. Unlike Burgstahler et al. (2006) most regressions produced
insignificant effects of the tested institutional factors. Even though the results are contrary to
previous literature, this does not diminish the indication that market forces and institutional
factors shape the way firms report incentives. However, the influence of corruption may be
responsible for concealing the effects of the other factors.
Further examination of the two sub-periods of which the sample consists reveal that
the application of international accounting standards does not necessarily lead to a reduction
in the level of earnings management. This in fact contrasts the prediction made by this study
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in the beginning. A determinant, which was identified as highly significant in most
regressions, is corruption. In conjunction with the non-significance of the other institutional
factors, evidence is presented that corruption, even in low levels, can produce incentives for
earnings manipulation. This study does not attempt to identify the exact mechanism by which
corruption appears to sway earnings management. Nonetheless this strong relation may well
result in numerous policy implications. Even strong capital markets are affected and as the
evidence suggests, the adoption of IFRS does not substantially improve the situation.
Evidence is provided that earnings management is more distinct in countries with
weaker legal systems and enforcement. Countries with ineffective judicial system and feeble
enforcement together with high corruption make an environment that enhance incentives for
firms to mask true performance.
Although the study took into consideration various aspects of accounting research in
an effort to minimize possible biases, yet there are still several limitations. Earnings
management and earnings informativeness are difficult to measure. Thus, there is a
possibility which cannot be excluded, that results are biased by omitted variables or by the
difficulty of understanding all the relations among institutional factors. The second limitation
is the failure to include GDP per capita in the regression models. While previous studies
found that GDP per capita was a factor explaining the variation of earnings management
among countries (see Leuz et al., 2003), the high correlation did not allow exploring this
relation. Finally, the in the sample some industries were under-represented which in an extent
can effect some results. Other limitations were related to the formulation of earning
management proxies. Due to data restrictions all the proxies were calculated in the cross-
section. Therefore, the changes per year could not be estimated.
Based on the results of the study, there are several recommendations for future
research. First some of the limitations outlined in this study can be minimized or eliminated.
Future research can study multiple reporting incentives for firms in different environments.
Second, further studies should include private firms along with public firms. Private firms do
not require such extensive information disclosure. This may have an impact on earnings
management and corruption that ought to be examined. Third, this study only measured the
impact of capital market against earnings management and corruption. Future studies should
employ different institutional factors to measure additional influences. Finally another area
for future studies is how competition affects earnings management.
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Figure 1
Definitions of Variables
Variables Description
EM1
Is defined as the country’s median ratio of the standard deviation of operating income divided by
the standard deviation of cash flow from operations in firm-level, (multiplied by -1). Cash flow
from operations is equal to operating income minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as:
(Δtotal current assets - Δcash) - (Δtotal current liabilities - Δshort-term debt – Δincome taxes
payable) - depreciation expense, where Δ denotes the change over the last fiscal year.
EM2 Is defined as the country’s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change incash flow from operations both scaled by lagged total assets (multiplied by -1).
EM3 Is defined as the country’s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value ofthe cash flow from operations.
EM4
Is defined as the number of small profits divided by the number of small losses for each country. A
firm-year observation is classified as a small profit if net earnings (scaled by lagged total assets)
are in the range [0.00, 0.01]. A firm-year observation is classified as a small loss if net earnings
(scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range [-0.01, 0).
EMaggr The aggregate earnings management score is the average percentage rank across all four measuresfrom EM1 to EM4.
CPI Is defined as the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International from years 2000 to2009.
SIZE SIZE is measured as the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (in EUR thousands).
LEVERAGE Financial leverage is calculated as the ratio of total non-current liabilities to total assets.
GROWTH Is defined as the annual percentage change in revenue.
ROA Profitability is measured as return on assets (ROA) defined as net income divided by lagged totalassets.
CYCLE Operating Cycle is calculated as the addition of inventories held in days and accounts receivablesin days.
ORIGIN Classification of the legal origin
LEGAL The quality of the legal system and enforcement (LEGAL) measured by the mean of threeinstitutional variables (i.e., efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption index).
ACCRUAL ACCRUAL is the accrual index from Hung (2001) (updated for European countries by Comprix etal. (2003)), and captures differences in accrual accounting rules across countries.
TAX RATE RATE stands for the average corporate tax rate in percent of earnings before taxes (Source:Eurostat).
TAX
TAX is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if financial accounts for external reporting
and tax purposes are highly aligned, and 0 otherwise (see Alford et al. 1993; Hung 2001). We
assume a tax status of 1 for the three countries with missing tax information (Austria, Greece, and
Portugal).
SECREG
SECREG captures the strength of securities regulation mandating and enforcing disclosures for
publicly listed firms. It is measured as the mean of the disclosure index, the liability standard index
and the public enforcement index from La Porta et al. (2006).
ANTIDIR ANTIDIR is the antidirector rights index from La Porta et al. (1998) capturing the legal protectionof minority shareholders.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Sample Firms and Countries
The full sample consists of 23,151 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009 across 14 countries of EU. Data
are obtained from the Worldscope database supplied by Thomson Reuters Datastream. For a country to be included in the
sample, at least 300 firm-year observations are needed. For this reason Luxembourg is excluded from analysis. Each firm
must have income statement and balance sheet information for at least three years before the mandatory adoption of IFRS
and at least three years after. Winsorization at 1st and 99th percentile is done before computing the measures. Banks,
insurance companies and financial holding are excluded from the sample. A unit of analysis is calculated per industry-level
using the industry classification of Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Firm size is measured as total EUR€
sales (in thousands). Capital intensity is measured as the ratio of long-term assets over total assets.  Average per capita GDP
is computed from 2000 to 2009. Inflation is measured as the average percentage change in consumer prices from 2000 to
2009. Volatility of GDP growth is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate in real per capita GDP from 2000 to
2009. GDP per capita, inflation and volatility of GDP growth are taken directly from Eurostat.
Country # FirmYears
Median firm
size in EUR€
Median
capital
intensity
Per-capita
GDP in
EUR€
Inflation (%)
Volatility of
GDP growth
(%)
Austria 373 332471 0.511 29550 1.89 0.685
Belgium 582 224189.5 0.504 28440 2.12 1.075
Denmark 806 132965 0.448 37480 2.03 0.742
Finland 875 120129 0.448 29900 1.82 1.046
France 3671 129888 0.366 27120 1.87 0.727
Germany 4200 117746 0.429 27450 1.65 0.676
Greece 1587 69775 0.445 17180 3.22 0.752
Ireland 299 298700 0.583 36420 2.95 1.830
Italy 1245 266007.5 0.482 23960 2.33 0.650
Netherlands 815 571086.5 0.473 31260 2.29 1.200
Portugal 341 304016.5 0.625 14440 2.60 1.330
Spain 693 475770.5 0.535 20190 2.98 1.126
Sweden 1861 80847.5 0.445 32440 1.84 0.728
United Kingdom 5803 97700 0.495 29210 1.85 0.774
Mean 1654 230092 0.485 27503 2.25 0.953
Median 845 178577 0.478 28825 2.08 0.763
Min 299 69775 0.366 14440 1.65 0.650
Max 5803 571087 0.625 37480 3.22 1.830
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Table 2
Earnings Management Measures By Country and IFRS Adoption
Fiscal-years from 2000 to 2009 Fiscal-years from 2000 to 2004 Fiscal-years from 2005 to 2009
Country
Industry
Observations EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EMaggr EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EMaggr EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EMaggr
Austria 8 -0.555 0.813 0.630 1.357 53.6 (9) -0.442 0.821 0.647 1.750 60.7 (8) -0.644 0.800 0.622 0.860 37.5 (10)
Belgium 7 -0.631 0.831 0.615 1.888 53.6 (8) -0.564 0.792 0.665 2.666 57.1 (9) -0.509 0.859 0.536 1.111 50.0 (8)
Denmark 9 -0.669 0.817 0.612 2.695 57.1 (7) -0.576 0.793 0.609 3.100 60.7 (7) -0.619 0.834 0.617 2.384 53.6 (7)
Finland 7 -0.777 0.746 0.545 2.000 29.5 (12) -0.717 0.692 0.568 2.833 33.9 (11) -0.770 0.789 0.526 1.583 25.0 (12)
France 9 -0.612 0.807 0.603 2.778 58.9 (6) -0.565 0.793 0.631 3.063 60.7 (6) -0.559 0.820 0.575 2.543 58.9 (6)
Germany 8 -0.594 0.814 0.745 2.514 67.9 (4) -0.535 0.770 0.807 2.328 60.7 (5) -0.484 0.853 0.678 2.758 75.0 (4)
Greece 8 -0.465 0.919 0.818 2.635 89.3 (2) -0.321 0.943 0.824 2.928 91.1 (2) -0.431 0.898 0.817 2.407 85.7 (2)
Ireland 7 -0.629 0.738 0.418 2.000 31.3 (11) -0.627 0.709 0.401 1.200 19.6 (12) -0.630 0.761 0.430 4.000 33.9 (11)
Italy 9 -0.637 0.853 0.649 2.153 62.5 (5) -0.558 0.847 0.678 1.945 64.3 (4) -0.560 0.860 0.614 2.428 64.3 (5)
Netherlands 8 -0.744 0.765 0.483 3.363 41.1 (10) -0.677 0.726 0.526 2.800 35.7 (10) -0.583 0.800 0.442 3.833 44.6 (9)
Portugal 7 -0.486 0.931 0.800 3.818 94.6 (1) -0.428 0.941 0.843 3.375 94.6 (1) -0.438 0.920 0.753 7.666 96.4 (1)
Spain 8 -0.563 0.882 0.562 5.375 76.8 (3) -0.476 0.878 0.581 6.660 76.8 (3) -0.484 0.887 0.543 4.660 78.6 (3)
Sweden 9 -0.858 0.692 0.514 1.367 14.3 (14) -0.795 0.642 0.540 1.357 14.3 (14) -0.714 0.733 0.471 1.380 17.9 (14)
United Kingdom 9 -0.728 0.718 0.465 1.727 19.6 (13) -0.698 0.646 0.470 1.794 19.6 (13) -0.629 0.772 0.457 1.670 28.6 (13)
Mean 8.1 -0.639 0.809 0.604 2.548 53.6 -0.570 0.785 0.628 2.700 53.6 -0.575 0.827 0.577 2.806 53.6
Median 8.0 -0.630 0.814 0.608 2.334 55.4 -0.564 0.793 0.620 2.733 60.7 -0.571 0.827 0.559 2.418 51.8
Standard Deviation 0.8 0.110 0.072 0.121 1.075 24.4 0.128 0.097 0.131 1.330 25.6 0.100 0.055 0.116 1.788 24.1
Min 7.0 -0.858 0.692 0.418 1.357 14.3 -0.795 0.642 0.401 1.200 14.3 -0.770 0.733 0.430 0.860 17.9
Max 9.0 -0.465 0.931 0.818 5.375 94.6 -0.321 0.943 0.843 6.660 94.6 -0.431 0.920 0.817 7.666 96.4
The full sample consists of 23,151 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009 across 14 countries of EU. Data are obtained from the Worldscope database supplied by Thomson Reuters Datastream. For
a country to be included in the sample, at least 300 firm-year observations are needed. For this reason Luxembourg is excluded from analysis. Each firm must have income statement and balance sheet information
for at least three years before the mandatory adoption of IFRS and at least three years after. Winsorization at 1st and 99th percentile is done before computing the measures. Banks, insurance companies and financial
holding are excluded from the sample. A unit of analysis is calculated per industry-level using the industry classification of Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). EM1 is the country’s median ratio of the
standard deviation of operating income divided by the standard deviation of cash flow from operations in firm-level, (multiplied by -1). Cash flow from operations is equal to operating income minus accruals,
where accruals are calculated as: (Δtotal current assets - Δcash) - (Δtotal current liabilities - Δshort-term debt – Δincome taxes payable) - depreciation expense, where Δ denotes the change over the last fiscal year.
EM2 is the country’s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations both scaled by lagged total assets (multiplied by -1). EM3 is the country’s median ratio of the
absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of the cash flow from operations. EM4 is the number of small profits divided by the number of small losses for each country. A firm-year observation is classified as
a small profit if net earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range [0.00, 0.01]. A firm-year observation is classified as a small loss if net earnings (scaled by lagged total assets) are in the range [-0.01, 0).
Net earnings are bottomline reported income after interest, taxes, special items, extraordinary items, reserves, and any other item. The aggregate earnings management score is the average percentage rank across all
four measures from EM1 to EM4. EMaggr score are calculated so as higher values imply higher levels of earning management. The rank of each country based on EMaggr is reported in parenthesis.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Firm-Level Control Variables by Country and IFRS adoption
The full sample consists of 23,151 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009 across 14 countries of EU. Data are obtained from the Worldscope database supplied by Thomson Reuters Datastream. For
a country to be included in the sample, at least 300 firm-year observations are needed. For this reason Luxembourg is excluded from analysis. Each firm must have income statement and balance sheet information
for at least three years before the mandatory adoption of IFRS and at least three years after. Winsorization at 1st and 99th percentile is done before computing the measures. Banks, insurance companies and financial
holding are excluded from the sample. A unit of analysis is calculated per industry-level using the industry classification of Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).The table present the medians for control
variables per country. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International from years 2000 to 2009. SIZE is measured as the book value of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (in EUR
thousands). Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is calculated as the ratio of total non-current liabilities to total assets. GROWTH is defined as the annual percentage change in revenue. Profitability is measured as
return on assets (ROA) defined as net income divided by lagged total assets. CYCLE is calculated as the addition of inventories held in days and accounts receivables in days.
Country CPI SIZE LEVERAGE GROWTH ROA CYCLE CPI SIZE LEVERAGE GROWTH ROA CYCLE CPI SIZE LEVERAGE GROWTH ROA CYCLE
Austria 8.1 332471 34.6% 7.2% 3.8% 137 7.9 201188 34.4% 5.9% 3.2% 133 8.3 304702 34.9% 7.9% 4.5% 138
Belgium 7.1 224189.5 36.7% 5.3% 3.5% 141 7.0 255686.5 39.3% 5.2% 2.5% 140.5 7.2 226749.5 33.5% 5.4% 4.3% 140
Denmark 9.4 132965 56.0% 5.8% 3.3% 132 9.5 94616 55.5% 4.0% 2.8% 131 9.4 150921 56.2% 7.4% 3.7% 132
Finland 9.4 120129 28.2% 5.5% 4.7% 118 9.6 83631 27.8% 6.3% 4.5% 116 9.3 122977 28.5% 5.3% 4.9% 119
France 7.0 129888 28.5% 5.8% 3.2% 154 6.7 96743 30.0% 7.1% 3.1% 154 7.2 153449 27.0% 4.7% 3.4% 155
Germany 7.7 117746 63.8% 4.6% 2.4% 124 7.5 106923 65.1% 4.3% 1.7% 124 8.0 126610 62.3% 4.8% 3.2% 123
Greece 4.3 69775 23.9% 7.5% 2.0% 242 4.3 86493 14.0% 10.4% 2.6% 240 4.4 128707 32.4% 3.9% 1.4% 246.5
Ireland 7.5 298700 27.9% 5.9% 4.3% 96 7.4 234055 25.6% 8.3% 4.6% 94.5 7.6 373800 31.3% 3.4% 4.0% 96
Italy 5.3 266007.5 37.2% 6.1% 1.9% 213 5.4 259462 36.2% 7.0% 1.7% 224 5.3 473086 39.4% 4.4% 2.0% 201
Netherlands 8.8 571086.5 29.7% 3.6% 4.5% 115 8.9 306283 32.1% 2.5% 4.5% 108.5 8.8 510057 27.0% 4.5% 5.6% 116
Portugal 6.3 304016.5 49.2% 4.1% 1.6% 141 6.4 371923 55.3% 4.9% 1.4% 149 6.3 385843.5 49.2% 2.2% 2.4% 137.5
Spain 6.8 475770.5 35.2% 8.6% 4.0% 184 7.0 605893.5 32.9% 7.4% 3.9% 193.5 6.6 636156.5 37.6% 9.2% 4.1% 177.5
Sweden 9.2 80847.5 21.8% 5.7% 3.3% 127 9.2 55576.5 26.0% 4.6% 1.8% 125 9.2 71212 17.7% 6.5% 4.7% 129
United Kingdom 8.3 97700 18.7% 5.2% 3.5% 121 8.5 105655 15.6% 7.6% 3.0% 122 8.2 89583 21.9% 3.0% 4.1% 120
Mean 7.5 230092 35.1% 5.8% 3.3% 146 7.5 204581 35.0% 6.1% 2.9% 147 7.6 268132 35.6% 5.2% 3.7% 145
Median 7.6 178577 32.1% 5.8% 3.4% 135 7.4 154056 32.5% 6.1% 2.9% 132 7.8 190099 33.0% 4.7% 4.0% 135
Std 1.5 153999 13.0% 1.3% 1.0% 40 1.6 151841 14.8% 2.0% 1.1% 43 1.5 180199 12.7% 2.0% 1.2% 39
Min 4.3 69775 18.7% 3.6% 1.6% 96 4.3 55577 14.0% 2.5% 1.4% 95 4.4 71212 17.7% 2.2% 1.4% 96
Max 9.4 571087 63.8% 8.6% 4.7% 242 9.6 605894 65.1% 10.4% 4.6% 240 9.4 636157 62.3% 9.2% 5.6% 247
Fiscal-years from 2000-2009 Fiscal-years from 2000-2004 Fiscal-years from 2005-2009
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Institutional Variables by Country and IFRS adoption
Legal Enforcement Quality Accrual Accountingrules Tax Alignment
Securities Regulation and
Investor Protection
Country
Legal origin LEGAL ACCRUAL RATE(2000-2009)
RATE
(2000-2004)
RATE
(2005-2009) TAX SECREG ANTIDIR
Austria German 9.36 (1) 0.55 (0) 29.5% (1) 34.0% (1) 25.0% (1) 1 0.18 2
Belgium French 9.44 (1) 0.64 (1) 35.9% (1) 37.7% (1) 34.0% (1) 1 0.34 0
Denmark Scandinavian 10.00 (1) 0.55 (0) 28.3% (1) 30.4% (1) 26.2% (1) 0 0.50 2
Finland Scandinavian 10.00 (1) 0.77 (1) 27.5% (0) 29.0% (1) 26.0% (1) 1 0.49 3
France French 8.68 (0) 0.64 (1) 35.3% (1) 36.1% (1) 34.5% (1) 1 0.58 3
Germany German 9.05 (0) 0.41 (0) 26.0% (0) 29.9% (1) 22.2% (0) 1 0.21 1
Greece French 6.82 (0) 0.41 (0) 31.9% (1) 36.5% (1) 27.2% (1) 1 0.38 2
Ireland English 8.40 (0) 0.82 (1) 14.8% (0) 17.0% (0) 12.5% (0) 0 0.49 4
Italy French 7.07 (0) 0.59 (0) 33.0% (1) 35.2% (1) 30.8% (1) 1 0.46 1
Netherlands French 10.00 (1) 0.77 (1) 31.1% (1) 34.7% (1) 22.7% (0) 0 0.62 2
Portugal French 7.19 (0) 0.55 (0) 27.4% (0) 29.8% (1) 25.0% (1) 1 0.55 3
Spain French 7.14 (0) 0.77 (1) 33.8% (1) 35.0% (1) 32.5% (1) 1 0.50 4
Sweden Scandinavian 10 (1) 0.64 (1) 27.8% (0) 28.0% (1) 27.7% (1) 1 0.45 3
United Kingdom English 9.22 (1) 0.86 (1) 29.6% (1) 30.0% (1) 29.2% (1) 0 0.72 5
The table presents raw and dichotomized indicator values (in parentheses) of the institutional proxies used in the analyses across the 14 countries from the European Union. The legal variables consist of two
measures from La Porta et al. (1998): the classification of the legal origin and the quality of the legal system and enforcement (LEGAL) measured by the mean of three institutional variables (i.e., efficiency of the
judicial system, rule of law, and corruption index). TAX is an indicator variable taking on the value of 1 if financial accounts for external reporting and tax purposes are highly aligned, and 0 otherwise (see Alford et
al. 1993; Hung 2001). We assume a tax status of 1 for the three countries with missing tax information (Austria, Greece, and Portugal). RATE stands for the average corporate tax rate in percent of earnings before
taxes (Source: Eurostat). ACCRUAL is the accrual index from Hung (2001) (updated for European countries by Comprix et al. (2003)), and captures differences in accrual accounting rules across countries.
SECREG captures the strength of securities regulation mandating and enforcing disclosures for publicly listed firms. It is measured as the mean of the disclosure index, the liability standard index and the public
enforcement index from La Porta et al. (2006). ANTIDIR is the antidirector rights index from La Porta et al. (1998) capturing the legal protection of minority shareholders. Continuous institutional factors are
transformed into binary variables splitting by the median except TAX RATE where 28, 28 and 25 percent are used as a cut-off for each sub-period respectively and ANTIDIR where it is spitted at 4, which is
commonly viewed as an indication of high investor protection.
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Table 5
Univariate Results
Panel A: Spearman Correlation Coefficients
Period of fiscal years 2000 to 2009
Variables (n=115) EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EMaggr
EM2 0.485**
EM3 0.367** 0.458**
EM4 0.223# 0.223# 0.162
EMaggr 0.760** 0.782** 0.727** 0.568**
CPI -0.332* -0.451** -0.368** -0.216# -0.473**
LEGAL -0.295* -0.445** -0.318** -0.234# -0.438**
Panel B: Comparison across CPI, Legal enforcement subgroups
The full sample consists of 23,151 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009 across 14 countries of EU. EMaggr, is the average percentage rank across all four individual earnings management scores,
EM1 to EM4, as described in Table 1. EM scores are constructed such that higher values imply higher levels of earnings management. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International from
years 2000 to 2009. The legal variables consist of two measures from La Porta et al. (1998): the classification of the legal origin, and the quality of the legal system and enforcement (LEGAL) measured by the mean
of three institutional variables (i.e., efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption index). Panel A presents the spearman correlations between earnings management variables and the two proxies for
corruption. Panel B reports the mean and median for the subgroups and the t-statistic for the two mean difference test.
Period of fiscal years 2005 to 2009
Variables (n=109) EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EMaggr
EM2 0.432**
EM3 0.312** 0.498**
EM4 0.118 0.273* 0.193
EMaggr 0.705** 0.791** 0.750** 0.590**
CPI -0.364** -0.396** -0.461** -0.230# -0.514**
LEGAL -0.320** -0.419** -0.456** -0.281* -0.512**
Period of fiscal years 2000 to 2004
Variables (n=109) EM1 EM2 EM3 EM4 EMaggr
EM2 0.523**
EM3 0.419* 0.472**
EM4 0.122 0.202# 0.279*
EMaggr 0.750** 0.791** 0.774** 0.535**
CPI -0.464** -0.523** -0.364** -0.171 -0.537**
LEGAL -0.429** -0.495** -0.304** -0.143 -0.485**
Corruption Perception Index
(variable Emagg)
Test of
differences
High Corruption Mean 47.83
(n=57) Median 50.00 (3.805)**
Low Corruption Mean 36.52
(n=58) Median 31.71
(n=58)
Legal Enforcement
(variable Emagg)
High Enforcement Quality Mean 35.42
(n=58) Median 30.00 (4.591)**
Low Enforcement Quality Mean 48.72
(n=57) Median 50.00
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Table 6
Earnings Management and Corruption: Base Models, = + + + + + + + +
Period of fiscal years 2000 to 2009 Period prior to IFRS adoption (2000-2004) Period after IFRS adoption (2005-2009)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
n 115 115 115 109 109 109 109 109 109
CPI - - -4.646*(-2.38) - -
-4.812*
(-2.49) - -
-7.791**
(-3.58)
LEGAL - -2.502(-1.05) - -
-0485
(-0.13) - -
-3.572
(-1.47) -
SIZE 0.716(0.32)
-1.359
(-0.46)
-2.506
(-0.98)
1.100
(0.47)
0.726
(0.19)
-1.741
(-0.68)
1.099
(0.55)
-1.334
(-0.51)
-3.168
(-1.41)
LEVERAGE 0.530**(4.18)
0.586**
(4.26)
0.664**
(4.88)
0.607**
(4.3)
0.600**
(3.96)
0.544**
(3.88)
0.594**
(3.83)
0.582**
(3.77)
0.581**
(3.96)
GROWTH 1.134(0.74)
0.338
(0.2)
0.804
(0.53)
2.441*
(2.2)
2.259
(1.26)
0.447
(0.33)
-0.791
(-0.9)
-0.281
(-0.3)
1.183
(1.18)
ROA -1.946(-0.74)
0.460
(0.13)
2.295
(0.73)
0.111
(0.06)
0.238
(0.11)
2.169
(1.1)
4.000
(0.9)
5.110#
(1.15)
7.391#
(1.72)
CYCLE 0.162*(2.41)
0.151*
(2.21)
0.078
(1.05)
0.158**
(3.21)
0.153*
(2.53)
0.090
(1.63)
0.179#
(1.97)
0.135*
(2.16)
-0.021
(-0.28)
Intercept -9.263(-0.38)
35.191
(0.71)
60.510
(1.6)
-30.900
(-1.29)
-20.537
(-0.24)
57.553
(1.35)
-20.797
(-0.88)
47.993
(0.91)
111.333*
(2.58)
R2 0.3952 0.4014 0.4255 0.3849 0.3850 0.4201 0.3590 0.3723 0.4307
Adj- R2 0.3675 0.3681 0.3936 0.3550 0.3488 0.3550 0.3279 0.3354 0.3972
**, *, and # indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
The full sample consists of 23,151 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009 across 14 countries of EU. The dependent variable, EMaggr, is the average percentage rank across all four individual
earnings management scores, EM1 to EM4, as described in Table 1. EM scores are constructed such that higher values imply higher levels of earnings management. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index from
Transparency International from years 2000 to 2009. The legal variables consist of two measures from La Porta et al. (1998): the classification of the legal origin (ORIGIN), and the quality of the legal system and
enforcement (LEGAL) measured by the mean of three institutional variables (i.e., efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption index). SIZE is measured as the book value of total assets at the end of
the fiscal year (in EUR thousands). Natural log of the size variable is used in this analysis. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is calculated as the ratio of total non-current liabilities to total assets. GROWTH is
defined as the annual percentage change in revenue. Profitability is measured as return on assets (ROA) defined as net income divided by lagged total assets. CYCLE is calculated as the addition of inventories held
in days and accounts receivables in days.
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Table 7
Earnings Management and Corruption: The Role of Tax Alignment, Accrual Accounting Rules, Securities Regulation, and Investor Protection., = + + + + + + + +
Panel A: Period from 2000 to 2009
Tax Aligment AccrualAccounting
Securities and Regulation
and Investor Protection Tax Aligment
Accrual
Accounting
Securities and Regulation
and Investor Protection
Variables TAX TAX_CONF ACCRUAL SECREG ANTIDIR TAX TAX_CONF ACCRUAL SECREG ANTIDIR
n 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Conditional Variable 2.040(0.63)
5.212
(1.2)
-3.796
(-0.83)
2.103
(0.74)
-6.073#
(-1.76)
2.493
(1.04)
11.646**
(2.9)
-3.779
(-0.76)
0.188
(0.05)
-11.029**
(2.12)
CPI -5.500**(-3.18)
-4.598**
(-2.41)
-5.061**
(-2.97)
-5.566**
(-3.23)
-5.525**
(-3.09) - - - - -
LEGAL - - - - - -3.633(-1.53)
-4.878*
(-2.05)
-4.003
(-1.57)
-3.262
(-1.13)
-7.200**
(-2.63)
SIZE -2.497(-0.98)
-2.991
(-1.16)
-2.841
(-1.1)
-2.765
(-1.08)
-2.103
(-0.83)
-0.891
(-0.3)
-4.851
(-1.49)
-1.227
(-0.39)
-0.551
(-0.17)
-2.819
(-0.93)
LEVERAGE 0.637**(4.71)
0.644**
(4.79)
0.585**
(3.87)
0.638**
(4.73)
0.609**
(4.52)
0.495**
(3.74)
0.629**
(4.59)
0.435*
(2.94)
0.483**
(3.19)
0.511**
(3.97)
GROWTH 1.569(1.27)
0.890
(0.64)
1.420
(1.12)
1.973
(1.63)
1.843
(1.52)
2.046
(1.38)
-0.872
(-0.48)
2.096
(1.34)
2.682
(1.01)
2.037
(1.48)
ROA 1.512(0.5)
0.870
(0.29)
2.760
(0.79)
0.730
(0.24)
2.128
(0.71)
-2.353
(-0.74)
0.820
(0.25)
-1.519
(-0.39)
-3.508
(-0.88)
1.962
(0.54)
Intercept 75.954*(2.23)
80.141#
(2.38)
85.070*
(2.45)
80.123*
(2.37)
71.337*
(2.12)
58.833
(1.24)
118.782*
(2.34)
71.640
(1.39)
56.136
(1.05)
105.401*
(2.12)
R2 0.4218 0.4273 0.4233 0.4225 0.4359 0.3813 0.4193 0.3775 0.3742 0.4131
Adj- R2 0.3896 0.3955 0.3913 0.3905 0.4046 0.3469 0.387 0.3429 0.3394 0.3805
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Panel B: Period from 2000 to 2004
Tax Aligment AccrualAccounting
Securities and Regulation
and Investor Protection Tax Aligment
Accrual
Accounting
Securities and Regulation
and Investor Protection
Variables TAX TAX_CONF ACCRUAL SECREG ANTIDIR TAX TAX_CONF ACCRUAL SECREG ANTIDIR
n 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Conditional Variable 11.287**(3.41)
11.287**
(3.41)
0.71
(0.18)
0.643
(0.19)
-12.865*
(-2.17)
13.179**
(3.96)
13.159**
(3.95)
-1.491
(-0.37)
-5.696#
(-1.63)
-15.951**
(-3.87)
CPI -5.122**(-3.1)
-5.122*
(-3.1)
-6.464**
(-3.64)
-6.487**
(-3.58)
-2.242
(-0.89) - - - - -
LEGAL - - - - - -5.255#(-1.78)
-5.042#
(-1.72)
-5.532#
(-1.7)
-7.253*
(-2.25)
-2.055
(-0.66)
SIZE -1.088(-0.45)
-1.088
(-0.45)
-1.353
(-0.51)
-1.356
(-0.51)
4.807
(1.28)
-1.790
(-0.51)
-1.519
(-0.44)
-0.791
(-0.21)
-2.351
(-0.63)
5.404
(1.4)
LEVERAGE 0.484**(3.64)
0.484**
(3.64)
0.523*
(3.18)
0.501**
(3.48)
0.508**
(3.71)
0.465**
(3.31)
0.462**
(3.27)
0.462**
(2.67)
0.519**
(3.45)
0.494**
(3.49)
GROWTH 0.728(0.57)
0.728
(0.57)
0.762
(0.56)
0.657
(0.47)
4.110
(2.01)
1.077
(0.63)
1.182
(0.69)
1.635
(0.9)
0.975
(0.53)
4.650*
(2.49)
ROA 2.887(1.53)
2.887
(1.53)
1.401
(0.71)
1.319
(0.64)
0.003
(0.00)
1.995
(0.96)
1.899
(0.91)
-0.378
(-0.18)
2.013
(0.77)
-0.305
(-0.15)
Intercept 55.430(1.4)
55.430
(1.40)
79.194#
(1.90)
81.093#
(1.84)
-38.878
(-0.58)
71.247
(1.02)
65.876
(0.95)
75.707
(1.00)
106.804
(1.42)
-46.091
(-0.6)
R2 0.4660 0.4660 0.4052 0.4052 0.4313 0.4334 0.4322 0.3463 0.3621 0.4294
Adj- R2 0.4346 0.4346 0.3702 0.3702 0.3979 0.4001 0.3988 0.3079 0.3245 0.3959
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Panel C: Period from 2004 to 2009
Tax Aligment AccrualAccounting
Securities and Regulation
and Investor Protection Tax Aligment
Accrual
Accounting
Securities and Regulation
and Investor Protection
Variables TAX TAX_CONF ACCRUAL SECREG ANTIDIR TAX TAX_CONF ACCRUAL SECREG ANTIDIR
n 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Conditional Variable 10.078**(2.69)
10.761**
(3.02)
2.856
(0.7)
6.917*
(2.13)
-5.595#
(-1.76)
14.199**
(4.18)
14.384**
(4.2)
-1.783
(-0.42)
-3.191
(-1.11)
-13.396**
(-3.96)
CPI -4.826**(-3.47)
-4.856**
(-3.69)
-7.589**
(-6.41)
-9.049**
(-6.66)
-7.161**
(-6.65) - - - - -
LEGAL - - - - - -4.135*(-2.49)
-4.080**
(-2.45
-7.504**
(-4.67)
-7.263**
(-4.60)
-9.551**
(-6.33)
SIZE -0.717(-0.33)
-2.216
(-1.11)
-3.293
(-1.55)
-5.660*
(-2.36)
-2.043
(-0.97)
-0.308
(-0.13)
-2.255
(-1.00)
-3.493
(-1.42)
-2.745
(-1.08)
-3.385
(-1.51)
LEVERAGE 0.507**(3.55)
0.707**
(4.93)
0.664**
(3.71)
0.683**
(4.62)
0.553**
(3.85)
0.426**
(3.00)
0.690**
(4.65)
0.454**
(2.46)
0.475**
(3.10)
0.463**
(3.25)
GROWTH 0.151(0.18)
0.157
(-0.18)
1.046
(1.32)
1.399#
(1.75)
0.945
(1.2)
-0.379
(-0.46)
-0.739
(-0.86)
0.665
(0.78)
0.537
(0.63)
0.526
(0.66)
ROA 4.235(0.98)
5.908
(1.43)
7.242#
(1.69)
10.745*
(2.40)
8.077#
(1.91)
0.968
(0.23)
2.913
(0.7)
3.795
(0.84)
3.075
(0.68)
8.185#
(1.88)
Intercept 58.522#(1.9)
71.079*
(2.54)
104.587**
(3.82)
137.987**
(4.37)
92.976**
(3.41)
57.945
(1.54)
73.793*
(2.05)
129.827**
(3.58)
119.568**
(3.19)
146.371**
(4.35)
R2 0.4680 0.4770 0.4330 0.4545 0.4471 0.4394 0.4402 0.3447 0.3513 0.4311
Adj- R2 0.4367 0.4463 0.3997 0.4224 0.4146 0.4064 0.4072 0.3061 0.3132 0.3976
**, *, and # indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
The full sample consists of 23,151 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009 across 14 countries of EU. The dependent variable, EMaggr, is the average percentage rank across all four individual
earnings management scores, EM1 to EM4, as described in Table 1. EM scores are constructed such that higher values imply higher levels of earnings management. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index from
Transparency International from years 2000 to 2009. The legal variables consist of two measures from La Porta et al. (1998): the classification of the legal origin (ORIGIN), and the quality of the legal system and
enforcement (LEGAL) measured by the mean of three institutional variables (i.e., efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, and corruption index). SIZE is measured as the book value of total assets at the end of
the fiscal year (in EUR thousands). Natural log of the size variable is used in this analysis. Financial leverage (LEVERAGE) is calculated as the ratio of total non-current liabilities to total assets. GROWTH is
defined as the annual percentage change in revenue. Profitability is measured as return on assets (ROA) defined as net income divided by lagged total assets. CYCLE is calculated as the addition of inventories held
in days and   accounts receivables in days. Continuous institutional factors are transformed into binary variables splitting by the median (except for TAX_CONF where 28 percent for periods 2000 to 2009 and 200
to 2004 and 25 percent for period 2005 to 2009 are used as a cut-off points, and ANTIDIR which is split by the value of 4). The model includes the main effects and the interaction term of the conditioning variable
and base models (see table 5, model 1 and 2). The ROA in panel C is an indicator variable, with median as cut-off point because of the high correlation with the other variables.
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Table 8
Comparison of Pre and Post IFRS Adoption Periods
Panel A: Comparison of Pre and Post IFRS Adoption Periods on Country Level
Fiscal-years from 2000-2004 Fiscal-years from 2005-2009
Country
Variability
of ΔNI
Variability of
ΔNI over ΔCF
Correlation of
ACC and CF
Variability
of ΔNI
Variability
of ΔNI
over ΔCF
Correlation of
ACC and CF
Small
positive
NI (SPOS)
Austria 0.0069 0.3174 -0.7345** 0.0786† 7.2929** -0.5799** -0.2031
Belgium 0.0272 1.6130 -0.6010** 0.1555† 8.4997 -0.6002** -0.2353#
Denmark 0.0536 0.0616 -0.6665** 0.0768† 0.0081** -0.8853** 0.0751
Finland 0.0791 2.7098 -0.4440** 0.0363† 0.8982** -0.4516** -0.0543
France 0.6060 4.3028 -0.4946** 0.1032† 2.0171** -0.6023** -0.0012
Germany 0.5024 0.6095 -0.5320** 2.4379† 16.4851** -0.6243** -0.0306
Greece 0.0024 0.0595 -0.7999** 0.0084† 0.1124** -0.7570** -0.0727*
Ireland 0.2214 10.5326 -0.6754** 0.1652‡ 15.2158** -0.6289** 0.1532
Italy 0.0247 0.2803 -0.6005** 0.0117† 0.2619** -0.6459** -0.0174
Netherlands 0.1272 5.6605 -0.4850** 1.9808† 5.6975** -0.4443** 0.1727*
Portugal 0.0136 0.9231 -0.6237** 0.0070† 0.4347** -0.6535** 0.0363
Spain 0.0049 0.6169 -0.5832** 0.0470† 2.8803 -0.6240** 0.0652
Sweden 8.1618 83.8810 -0.3015** 0.2019† 4.7563** -0.4014** -0.0579
United Kingdom 0.3741 0.0386 -0.3122** 0.8701† 9.7926** -0.6111** 0.0046
Panel B: Comparison of Pre and Post IFRS Adoption Periods on pool firm-years
Earnings management  Measures
Variability of ΔNI 1.0382 1.3670
Variability of ΔNI over ΔCF 0.3677 0.0541
Correlation of ACC and CF
-
0.4614**
-
0.5478**
Small positive NI (SPOS) -0.0090
**, *, and # indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively.
†, ‡, indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent (one-tailed), respectively.
The full sample consists of 23,151 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2000 to 2009 across 14 countries of EU. The variability of ΔNI (ΔCF) is defined as the variance of residuals from a regression of the
changes in annual net income (net cash flows) scaled by total assets on the control variables. The variability of ΔNI over ΔCF is defined as the ratio of the variability of ΔNI divided by the variability of ΔCF.
Correlation of ACC and CF is the partial Spearman correlation between the residuals of accruals and the residuals of net cash flow; both sets of residuals are computed from a regression of each variable (scaled by
total assets) on the control variables. POST is an indicator variable that equals 1 for post adoption of IFRS period and 0 for pre adoption of IFRS period and regressed on SPOS and control variables. The small
positive NI (SPOS) variable is an indicator set to 1 for observations for which annual net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01 and set to 0 otherwise; the coefficient on the indicator variable is
reported.
